Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Precious Asset by Tulkens, Françoise
BYU Law Review
Volume 2014 | Issue 3 Article 3
April 2014
Freedom of Religion under the European
Convention on Human Rights: A Precious Asset
Françoise Tulkens
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the European Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, Religion Commons, and
the Religion Law Commons
This Conference Proceeding is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law Digital Commons. It
has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Françoise Tulkens, Freedom of Religion under the European Convention on Human Rights: A Precious Asset, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 509
(2014).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol2014/iss3/3
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015 12:00 PM 
 
509 
Freedom of Religion under the European Convention 
on Human Rights: A Precious Asset 
Françoise Tulkens* 
I would like to begin by saying that I am very grateful to your 
prestigious university and its law school, as well as to the 
International Center for Law and Religion Studies, for this 
invitation. It is an honor and a pleasure to be here with such an 
outstanding audience of judges, scholars, lawyers, NGOs, and public 
officials from all over the world. Let me also say that I am really 
moved by your hospitality and kindness and how grateful I am to all 
of you, especially to the volunteer students. Many thanks from the 
bottom of my heart. 
As the voice coming from Europe and as a modest contribution 
to the work of this conference, I shall touch on two issues, which are 
of course interrelated. First, how, in the European Convention on 
Human Rights, freedom of religion has built itself as a fundamental 
human right, and how this right has been interpreted by the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights in the context of our 
contemporary society. Secondly, I will address the question of 
conflicting rights and the various approaches used by the European 
Court of Human Rights to judge them. 
As we know, the European Convention on Human Rights was 
drafted and adopted on November 4, 1950, in the aftermath of 
World War II, and it entered into force in September 1953. It has 
just celebrated its sixtieth anniversary.1 Today, it has been ratified by 
forty-seven State Parties, and it has become the fundamental charter 
(magna carta) of the “common home Europe.” As far as the key 
elements of the Convention are concerned, its preamble is highly 
significant. It traces the outlines of a European ordre public. The 
rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention “are the 
 
* Former Judge and Vice President of the European Court of Human Rights, Professor 
emeritus at the University of Louvain (Belgium), and Associate Member of the Académie 
Royale de Belgique. This keynote address was given at the Twentieth Annual Law and Religion 
Symposium at Brigham Young University on October 6, 2013. 
 1. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 
4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5; 213 UNTS 221 [hereinafter ECHR]. 
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foundation of justice and peace in the world” and are best 
maintained “by an effective political democracy.”2 Democratic 
society is the focal point of human rights, the unifying force within a 
Europe of human rights in which the Convention acts as a basic law. 
Democracy is the central value of European ordre public. It would be 
a mistake to see the preamble as merely rhetorical. In interpreting 
and applying the Convention, the European Court of Human Rights 
relies heavily on these principles not only as a source of inspiration 
but also as a basis for its action. 
There are three key provisions of the European Convention on 
Human Rights that deal with religion. Article 9 provides the basic 
framework for freedom of religion. Article 14 ensures that the rights 
acknowledged by the Convention should be free from any 
discrimination. Article 2 of the First Additional Protocol to the 
Convention gives parents the right to regulate the religious 
education of their children. If the first and most central is Article 9, 
the two others are gaining importance, especially Article 14.3 
As a matter of fact, the “new” European Court of Human Rights 
set up in 1998 has received a growing number of applications 
concerning freedom of religion. As observed by Clare Ovey and 
Robin C.A. White, “[t]his increase in applications is seemingly 
attributable to factors such as the expansion of the Council of 
Europe eastwards, the contemporary importance of religion on the 
global political arena, and the changing religious demography of 
Europe.”4 
I. FREEDOM OF RELIGION AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
A. A Precious Asset 
As in many international treaties, Article 9, section 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights guarantees to everyone 
(every person) the right to freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion.5 As Malcolm Evans has pointed out, the idea that freedom 
 
 2. Id. at preamble. 
 3. See ANALYSE COMPARÉE DES DISCRIMINATIONS RELIGIEUSES EN EUROPE [A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION IN EUROPE] (Elisabeth Lambert 
Abdelgawad & Thierry Rambaud eds., 2011). 
 4. CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C. A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 439 (4th ed. 2006). 
 5. Carolyn Evans, Religious Freedom in European Human Rights Law: The Search for a 
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of religion is for everyone is essential.6 In a nutshell, this right 
includes freedom to change religion and belief either alone or in 
community with others and in public or private and also freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and 
observance. But only the last one may be subjected under Article 9 
section 2 to limitations (interferences) prescribed by law and 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety and 
for the protection of public order, health, morals, and the rights and 
freedoms of others.7 As we see, there is a substantial dividing line 
between freedom of religion (internal conviction, inner sphere) and 
freedom to manifest one’s religion in the public sphere (the 
expression of that conviction). Finally, as Renáta Uitz rightly 
observes, unlike the case of other civil and political rights, freedom of 
religion has an individual as well as a collective aspect.8 The freedoms 
guaranteed are closely related to freedom of expression (Article 10 of 
the Convention) and to freedom of association (Article 11) since 
many religious and belief systems expect some form of community 
worship or association. 
Against this background, the Court has been called upon to 
address the scope and content of Article 9 in a wide variety of cases, 
involving matters as diverse as proselytism, the grant of registration 
of religious bodies, the refusal of authorizations for places of 
worship, prohibition on the wearing of religious dress or symbols in 
public places, and conscientious objection. In its case law the Court 
has reiterated the central importance played by religious and 
philosophical beliefs in European society. 
Before examining some of these elements, let’s get back to the 
“fundamentals” (fondamentaux). In 1993, in its first judgment 
under Article 9, the Court established the principle: “freedom of 
 
Guiding Conception, in RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, 385, 385–86 (Mark W. Janis & 
Carolyn Evans eds., 2004). See also MALCOM EVANS, RELIGIOUS, LIBERTY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE (2007). 
 6. Malcom Evans, Advancing Freedom of Religion or Belief: Agendas for Change, 1 
OXFORD J. L. RELIG. 5, 6 (2012). 
 7. Article 9 does not belong to the provisions included in the second paragraph of 
Article 15 as non-derogable. On this point the Convention differs from the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, where in Article 4 section 2 the freedom of thought, 
conscience, and religion laid down in Article 18 is declared non-derogable. See OVEY & 
WHITE, supra note 4, at 441. 
 8. RENÁTA UITZ, FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN EUROPEAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL CASE LAW 12 (2007). 
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thought, conscience and religion is one of the foundations of a 
‘democratic society’ within the meaning of the Convention. It is, in 
its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to 
make up the identity of believers and their conception of life, but it is 
also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics and the 
unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, 
which has been dearly won over the centuries, depends on it.”9 
Article 9 protects both religious and non-religious beliefs. This 
freedom entails, inter alia, the freedom to hold or not to hold 
religious beliefs and to practice or not to practice religion. 
Pluralism obviously, or implicitly, transcends all the Article 9 
jurisprudence.10 So pluralism, and especially its practical application, 
is perceived both with respect to the collective dimension of freedom 
of religion and with regard to its individual aspect. As a matter of 
fact, the idea of pluralism is found throughout the entire Convention 
and constitutes one of its interpretative principles. As stressed in the 
Gorzelik and Others v. Poland judgment of February 17, 2004, 
“pluralism is also built on the genuine recognition of, and respect 
for, diversity and the dynamics of cultural traditions, ethnic and 
cultural identities, religious beliefs, artistic, literary and socio-
economic ideas and concepts. The harmonious interaction of persons 
and groups with varied identities is essential for achieving social 
cohesion.”11 
What does the Court mean by religion and belief? The 
protection of Article 9 extends to a wide range of convictions and 
philosophies, not limited to religious belief. However, the Court did 
not offer a definition of religion or belief; it merely said that not all 
opinions or convictions constitute beliefs in the sense protected by 
Article 9 section 1. In reality, for the article to apply, a belief must 
“attain a certain level of cogency, seriousness, cohesion and 
importance,”12 and also be such as to be compatible with human 
dignity and democracy. The same position is held by the United 
 
 9. Kokkinakis v. Greece, App. No. 14307/88, 260-A Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 18, § 31 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 1993). 
 10. For an enunciation of the primordial importance of religious pluralism as one of the 
foundations of a democratic society, see Nolan and K. v. Russia, App. No. 2512/04, § 73 
(Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009). 
 11. Gorzelik and Others v. Poland, App. No. 44158/98, § 92 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2004). 
 12. Campbell and Cosans v. United Kingdom, No. 48, 4 Eur. H.R. Rep. (ser. A) 293, ¶ 
36 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1982). 
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Nations Human Rights Committee under the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.13 This means that mere ideas 
or opinions will not constitute a belief. The line is difficult to draw 
since belief is, of course, inherently subjective. 
Some may criticize the Court for failing to interpret Article 9 in 
such a way as to realize its full potential by not engaging with what is 
meant by the word “religion.” But, as observed by Nicolas Bratza, it 
is difficult to achieve a definition that is flexible enough to embrace 
the immense range of world faiths but, at the same time, precise 
enough to be capable of practical application.14 This wide protection 
has enabled the Court to hold the provision to be applicable not 
merely to traditional and long-established religions (Hinduism, 
Christianity, Islam, Judaïsm, Budhism, Sikkhism), but also to other 
forms of religious movements, including Druidism and Scientology, 
as well as to a wide range of philosophical beliefs (pacifism, atheism, 
etc.).15 Where there has been controversy as to whether a particular 
set of beliefs qualified as a religion, the Court has more recently 
taken the cautious view that it is not its task to rule in the abstract on 
such matters; in the absence of a European consensus, it stated that 
it would look to the domestic system for the nature of 
classification.16 It may not, in any event, be a crucial matter, since 
even if not a religion, a suitably conscientious system of beliefs or 
thoughts could still fall under Article 9. 
B. Individual Aspect 
The internal dimension, the forum internum, has been described 
by the former European Commission on Human Rights as one 
“largely exercised inside an individual’s heart and mind.”17 What is 
important is that this internal aspect of the right is an absolute one—
no limitation, no restriction, no interference or control by the State. 
 
 13. See U.N. Human Rights Comm., International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 14. Nicolas Bratza, The Precious Asset: Freedom of Religion under the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 14 ECCLESIASTICAL L. J. 256 (2012). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Kimlya v. Russia, App. No. 76836/01, 32782/03, ¶¶ 79–81, (Oct. 1, 2009 Eur. 
Ct. H.R.). 
 17. DONNA GOMIEN, SHORT GUIDE TO THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS 95 (3d ed. 2000). 
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So this provision prohibits persecution of a person on the 
grounds of his or her religion. In this respect, a very important 
judgment of the Court is M.E. v. France of June 6, 2013.18 The 
Court was called upon to decide if the expulsion of a Christian Copt 
to Egypt would expose him to inhuman or degrading treatment 
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention. And the answer of the 
Court, for the first time, was yes. This judgment sends today a 
strong message to all European states that are faced with the 
expulsion of a member of a religious community at risk and that are 
confronted, in asylum seekers cases, with assessing the risk of 
religious persecutions.19 Nevertheless, the very fact that somebody 
belongs to such a community is not enough; the risk of persecution 
in the individual case, the case at hand, must be established on a 
personal basis. Now what remains to be decided by the Court is the 
exact or precise meaning of “religious persecutions.”20 
But Article 9 also forbids the use of physical threats or sanctions 
to compel a person to deny, adhere to, or change his or her religion 
or belief. It also prohibits any form of coercion sufficiently strong so 
as to amount to indoctrination by the State. 
This internal dimension has been held to go further and to 
include a guarantee against a requirement to manifest or disclose the 
nature of one’s religion. In the case of Sinan Isik v. Turkey of 
February 2, 2010, the applicant’s complaint related to the reference 
to religion in his identity card, a public document that was 
frequently in use in daily life.21 In the view of the Court, it was no 
answer to the complaint that the space for religion in identity cards 
could be left blank, since persons with identity cards not containing 
information about religion would be distinguished against their 
wishes and on the basis of interference by the public authorities from 
those whose identity cards contained such an entry. A request for 
such information not to be included was held by the Court to be 
closely bound up with an individual’s most deeply held and private 
conviction.22 
 
 18. M.E. v. France, App. No. 50094/10 (June 6, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 19. Michael Kagan, Refugee Credibility Assessment and the “Religious Imposter” Problem, 
43 VAND.J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1233 (2010). 
 20. Nicolas Hervieu, Une progression sans révolution dans l’appréhension européenne 
des persécutions religieuses, Lettre “Actualités Droits-Libertés” du CREDOF (2013). 
 21. Sinan Isik v. Turkey, App. No. 21924/05 (Feb. 2, 2010, Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 22. Wasmuth v. Germany, App. No. 12884/03 (Feb. 17, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015  12:00 PM 
509 A Precious Asset 
 515 
Recently, the Court had to decide a very sensitive case 
concerning the relation between freedom of religion and 
discrimination, even if the applicant’s discrimination complaint on 
the basis of religion was examined under Article 14 and Article 8 of 
the Convention. As Lourdes Peroni rightly pointed out, “after 
leaving aside the ‘freedom to resign’ doctrine in the Eweida and 
Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 15 January 2013, the 
Court has just made another move towards greater recognition of 
the importance of freedom of religion. In the Vojnity v. Hungary 
judgment of 12 February 2013, the Court clearly recognizes religion 
as a ‘suspect’ ground of differentiation. As a result—and just like 
distinctions based on race, sex, and sexual orientation—states must 
give ‘very weighty reasons’ if they wish to justify differences based on 
religion.”23 In this case, the applicant’s religious convictions were 
decisive in the removal of his access rights to his children. Then—
and after asserting that only “very weighty reasons” could justify a 
difference of treatment based on religion—the Court found that 
there was actually no such reason in this case and concluded that the 
applicant had been discriminated on the basis of his religious belief, 
in his right to respect for family life.24 In my view, the move is 
certainly positive. It is hard to deny that religion has historically 
worked as a category of discrimination and persecution, and it 
therefore makes sense to apply heightened scrutiny to differences 
based on this ground.25 
 
 23. Lourdes Peroni, “Very Weighty Reasons” for Religion: Vojnity v. Hungary, 
STRASBOURG OBSERVERS BLOG (Feb. 27, 2013), 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/02/27/very-weighty-reasons-for-religion-vojnity-v-
hungary/. 
 24. Vojnity v. Hungary, § 38, App. No.29617/07 (Feb. 12, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 25. See the partly dissenting opinion of Judges Bratza, Hirvelä, and Nicolaou annexed 
to Redfearn v. the United Kingdom, § 12, App. No. 47335/06 (2012 Eur. Ct. H.R.). See also 
Kristin Henrard, Duties of Reasonable Accommodation in Relation to Religion and the European 
Court of Human Rights: A Closer Look at the Prohibition of Discrimination, the Freedom of 
Religion and Related Duties of State Neutrality, [hereinafter Duties of Reasonable 
Accommodation], 5 ERASMUS L. REV. 71, 71–72 (2012). Henrard, however, observes: “The 
supervisory practice of the Court is . . . rather ambivalent about the suspect nature of religion.” 
Henrard, supra, at 71. See also Kristin Henrard, Libertad de religion y minorias religiosas: una 
adaptacion adecuada de la diversidad religiosa? [Freedom of Religion and Religious Minorities: 
an Adequate Accommodation of Religious Diversity?], in DERECHOS HUMANOS Y DIVERSIDAD 
RELIGIOSA 247 (E.J. Ruiz Vieytez and G. Urrutia Asua eds., 2010). In the same direction, see 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Y and Z, where the Court of Justice of the European Union 
held that certain forms of serious interference with the public manifestation of religion may 
constitute persecution for reasons of religion. Joined cases C-71/11 & C-99/11, (April 19, 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015  12:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
516 
Moving now to the external dimension of freedom of religion, 
the distinction between the holding of a religion and its 
manifestation is a difficult one. As a matter of fact, the Court draws a 
distinction between an act or practice that manifested a religion or 
belief and one that is merely motivated by a religion. Nevertheless, 
the approach could bring the Court dangerously close to deciding 
whether a particular practice is formally required by a religion—a 
task the judges are unable to decide given the relevant theological 
issues. 
The Court has been confronted with different aspects of the 
manifestation of the freedom of religion: religious holidays;26 ritual 
slaughter;27 refusal to perform duties;28 religious symbols at work,29 
at school30, and in public.31 
The Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey judgment of February 
23, 2010 concerned the criminal conviction (and prison sentence of 
two to three months, commuted to a fine) of members of a religious 
group for their dress code (turban, black tunic, and stick) in public 
places (first outside a mosque in Ankara, then in the streets of the 
city), pursuant to an act of 1935 prohibiting the wearing of religious 
clothing except in places of worship and at religious ceremonies.32 
The Court found a violation of Article 9 of the Convention. This is 
the first judgment concerning the wearing of religious clothing in 
public space. This judgment is for me very important because 
religious intolerance is a daily reality in Europe. How can minority 
 
2012 E.C.R.). 
 26. Kosteski v. the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, App. No 55170/00 (April 
13, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 27. Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France, App. No 27417/95 (June 27, 2000 Eur. Ct. 
H.R.). 
 28. Ladele and McFarlane v. the United Kingdom, App No. 51671/10, 36516/10 
(Jan. 15, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 29. Eweida and Chaplin v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 48420/10, 59842/10 (Jan. 
15, 2013 Eur. Ct. H.R.). See Megan Pearson, Article 9 at a Crossroads: Interference Before and 
After Eweida, 13 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 580 (2013). 
 30. Leyla Sahin v. Turkey, App. No. 44774/98 (Nov. 10, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 31. Ahmet Arslan and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98 (Feb. 23, 2010 Eur Ct. 
H.R.). Concerning diverging views among human rights bodies on this aspect, see Françoise 
Tulkens and Sébastien Van Drooghenbroeck, The Domestic Courts’ Response to Divergent Views 
among International Human Rights Bodies Thoughts Prompted by the Singh v. France Case in 
LIBERAE COGITATIONES: LIBER AMICORUM MARC BOSSUYT 733 (André Alen, Veronique 
Joosten, Riet Leysen, & William Verrijdt eds., 2013). 
 32. Ahmet Arslan v. Turkey, App. No. 41135/98 (Feb. 23, 2010, Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
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religions be protected in public space in this context? Today, mainly 
targeted at Muslims, attacks on religious pluralism focus on refusing 
to share public space with the non-majority or only tolerating 
practices seen as secular.33 
C. Collective Aspect 
As rightly pointed out by Lech Garlicki, “[m]ost religions cannot 
be exercised in a proper manner if the believers are deprived of the 
possibility to act collectively. Thus, individual freedom of religion 
cannot be guaranteed unless there is a collateral guarantee for the 
freedom to found and to operate a church or other religious 
community.”34 So the Court has been faced, quite often recently and 
under various forms, with this “collective aspect of religious 
freedom.” In this area, as we will see, Article 9 and Article 11 
(freedom of association) are interrelated. 
“While religious freedom is primarily a matter of individual 
conscience, it also implies, inter alia, freedom to ‘manifest [one’s] 
religion’ alone and in private or in community with others, in public 
and within the circle of those whose faith one shares. Bearing witness 
in words and deeds is bound up with the existence of religious 
convictions.”35 
Religious freedom has several important manifestations which 
commit believers to exercise their rights in community with others, 
very often within the framework of a religious organisation or 
association. Freedom of religion as an individual right is discussed 
typically as being a liberty interest or negative right, where the 
 
 33. On November 27, 2013, the Grand Chamber held a hearing in the case of S.A.S. v. 
France concerning the ban on wearing the burqa and the niqab in the public space in France. 
See Saïla Ouald Chaib, S.A.S. v. France: A Short Summary of an Interesting Hearing, 
STRASBOURG OBSERVERS BLOG (Nov. 29, 2013), 
http://strasbourgobservers.com/2013/11/29/s-a-s-v-france-a-short-summary-of-an-
interesting-hearing. The Grand Chamber delivered its judgment in the case on July 1, 2014; 
the Court found no violation of Article 8 and no violation of Article 9 of the Convention on 
the basis of margin of appreciation and proportionality. See, however, the joint dissenting 
opinion of Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom annexed to the judgment. 
 34. Leszek Lech Garlicki, Collective Aspects of the Religious Freedoms: Recent 
Developments in the Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights, in CENSORIAL 
SENSITIVITIES: FREE SPEECH AND RELIGION IN A FUNDAMENTALIST WORLD 218, 218–19 (A. 
Sajo ed. 2007). 
 35. Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova, § 114, App. No. 
45701/99 (Dec. 13, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
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primary obligation of the state is to leave individuals undisturbed in 
the exercise of various aspects of religious freedom. When collective 
aspects of religious freedom are in the focus of attention, European 
scholars and lawyers instinctively turn to discuss the positive aspect of 
the right, namely, the obligation of the state to entrench or promote 
the enjoyment of religious freedom. 
Pluralism is the main model of the Court’s case law related to 
freedom of religion and the core principle which organizes church-
state relations. We see in the recent case law of the Court the 
developments of the principle of pluralism going in two main 
directions: no arbitrary State interferences, and State neutrality and 
impartiality.36 
As Robin White and Clare Ovey rightly observe, “the pursuit of 
multiculturalism and peaceful co-habitation of different religious 
groups within society has frequently proved challenging. The history 
of Europe is littered with examples of extreme religious intolerance 
and, indeed, the European Convention on Human Rights was 
conceived in the immediate aftermath of the persecution and 
genocide of the adherents of one religion, Judaism, in the hope that 
it would help to prevent such an atrocity ever taking place again. For 
many believers, religious faith is central to their existence and their 
most important defining characteristic. The Court is correct, 
therefore, to stress in its case law the duty of the State as a guarantor 
of pluralism and the fundamental nature of the rights to freedom of 
belief and freedom to manifest religion.”37 
As summarized by Nicolas Bratza, “cases reflecting this vital 
element of autonomy have tended to relate to state interference in 
one of three key areas: the internal organisation of the religious 
community, including the selection of its leaders; the grant or refusal 
of official recognition to certain faiths in national law; and the 
regulation by the state of places of worship. In each area the Court 
has consistently stressed the need for state neutrality.”38 
Is there an obligation to protect against “dangerous religions”? 
While most would agree with the Court’s view expressed in Serif v. 
Greece that in circumstances of religious tension governments should 
 
 36. For further analysis, see Francoise Tulkens, The European Convention on Human 
Rights and Church-State Relations: Pluralism vs. Pluralism, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2575 
(2009). 
 37. See OVEY & WHITE, supra note 4, at 423–24. 
 38. Bratza, supra note 14, at 262. 
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work to promote pluralism and “‘ensure tolerance between the rival 
factions,’ it may frequently be the case that allowing one person 
complete freedom to manifest his religion or belief would be to 
impinge—sometimes with dangerous consequences—on the rights of 
others. It would therefore perhaps be understandable if, in certain 
cases, the Court were to allow a wide margin of appreciation to place 
restrictions of the freedom to manifest religion or belief.”39 
However, some argue “that the Court has demonstrated a certain 
lack of empathy for the believer, and has appeared only to pay lip-
service to the commitment to religious freedom proclaimed . . . .”40 
Others are going further and submit that (especially) “when faced 
with contestations touching upon the issue of expression of religion 
in the public sphere,” the Court has adopted stances that are 
questionable from the viewpoint of the principles it has itself 
identified as central for religious freedom, first and foremost, the 
protection of pluralism.41 In the case law of the Court today, I also 
observe that the main limitations to the right of religious freedom 
(and also the freedom of thought or conscience) are motivated by 
the need to protect democratic societies from the danger of Islam42 
and sects.43 
II. CONFLICTS OF RIGHTS 
Here the sensitive question is the conflict (or potential conflict) 
between freedom of religion and other rights,44 in particular freedom 
 
 39. Serif v. Greece, App. No. 38178/97 (Dec. 14, 1999, Eur. Ct. H.R.). See also OVEY 
& WHITE, supra note 4, at 423–24. 
 40. Serif, App. No. 38178/97. 
 41. Julie Ringelheim, Rights, Religion and the Public Sphere: the European Court of 
Human Rights in Search of a Theory?, in LAW, STATE AND RELIGION IN THE NEW EUROPE: 
DEBATES AND DILEMMAS 283 (Lorenzo Zucco & Camil Ungureanu eds., 2012). 
 42. Refah Partisi and Others v. Turkey, App. No. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 
41344/98 (Feb. 13, 2003 Eur. Ct. H.R.) (Grand Council Judgment). 
 43. Leela Förderkreis E.V. and Others v. Germany, App. No. 44774/98 (Nov. 6, 2008 
Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 44. See also, but on different aspects, Ian Leigh, Balancing Religious Autonomy and 
other Human Rights under the European Convention, 1 OXFORD J. L. RELIG. 1 (2012); 
Carolyn Evans & Anna Hood, Religious Autonomy and Labor Law: A Comparison of the 
Jurisprudence of the United States and the European Court of Human Rights, 1 OXFORD J. OF 
L. RELIG. 23 (2012); Lourdes Peroni, U.S. Supreme Court and ECHR: Conflicts Between 
Religious Autonomy and Other Fundamental Rights, STRASBOURG OBSERVERS BLOG (Feb. 2, 
2012), http://strasbourgobservers.com/2012/02/02/u-s-supreme-court-and-ecthr-
conflicts-between-religious-autonomy-and-other-fundamental-rights/. 
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of expression. How are these two rights, equally protected by the 
Convention, to be reconciled? Even though the problem of conflicts 
of law is a classic problem that has long preoccupied jurists and 
philosophers,45 such conflicts are becoming increasingly frequent in 
many fields, as both the rights protected by the Convention and 
states’ obligations have evolved. So how are we to judge, how should 
we assess, these situations of conflict between fundamental rights?46 
The Court has, if I may say, the choice between different approaches, 
each of them having potentialities and limits. 
A. The Necessity Test 
One of the most common ways of resolving conflicts of law is 
suggested by the actual structure of certain provisions of the 
Convention—the very ones which concern us here, Articles 9 and 
10—which, on the one hand, recognise a right or a freedom and, on 
the other hand, add that limitations are allowed on certain conditions. 
So we are in the field of limitations on the rights secured, which 
confronts us with the general problem that, in a democratic society, 
hardly any rights are totally absolute. Moreover, these limitations or 
restrictions illustrate the classic dialectic, where fundamental rights are 
concerned, between safeguarding the individual right and defending 
the general interest. For example, as regards Article 9, freedom to 
manifest one’s religion or one’s religious beliefs is not an absolute 
right. It may be set against the rights and freedoms of others, which 
implies, inter alia, respect for everyone’s beliefs in relation to 
proselytising47 and protection of minors,48 or the protection of public 
order,49 security,50 or public health.51 
 
 45. See Robert Alexy, Balancing Constitutional Review and Representation, 3 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 572, 572–81 (2005); Steven Greer, Balancing and the European Court of Human 
Rights: A Contribution to the Habermas-Alexy Debate, 63 CAMBRIDGE L. J., 412, 417 (2004). 
 46. Here I base myself mainly on Olivier De Schutter and Françoise Tulkens, Rights in 
Conflict: The European Court of Human Rights as a Pragmatic Institution, in CONFLICTS 
BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 169 (Eva Brems ed., 2008). 
 47. Kokkinakis v. Greece, § 33, App. No. 14307/88 (May 25,1993 Eur. Ct. H.R.); 
Larissis and Others v. Greece, App. No (February 24, 1998 Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 48. Dahlab v. Switzerland, App. No. 42393/98 (Feb. 15, 2001 Eur. Ct. H.R.); Ciftci v. 
Turkey, App. No. 71860/01 (June 17, 2004). 
 49. Vergos v. Greece, § 33, App. No. 65501/01 (June 24, 2004 Eur. Ct. H.R.), 
(rational urban planning). 
 50. Phull v. France, § 21, App. No. 35753/03 (January 11, 2005 Eur. Ct. H.R.) 
(wearing of the turban and security at airports). 
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The method employed by the Court when called upon to judge 
what are known as relatively protected rights is well known. It 
proceeds in three stages: interference may be justified if it is 
prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim, and is necessary in a 
democratic society, which implies a pressing social need. The 
combination of these three conditions opens the way to the 
irresistible rise of the principle or criterion of proportionality.52 
One significant recent example: in the case of Giniewski v. 
France, the applicant, a journalist, sociologist and historian, had 
written a newspaper article on John-Paul II’s encyclical “The 
splendour of truth.”53 An association complained that the article was 
defamatory of the Christian community, and the domestic courts 
found that interference with freedom of expression was justified by 
the need for “protection of the reputation or rights of others.”54 In 
its judgment of January 31, 2006, the Court observed that, although 
the applicant’s article did indeed criticise a papal encyclical and thus 
the position of the Pope, such an analysis could not be extended to 
the whole of Christianity, which comprises various strands. It 
considered above all that the applicant was seeking to develop an 
argument about the scope of a specific doctrine and its possible links 
with the origins of the Holocaust. In so doing he had made a 
contribution, which by definition was open to discussion, to a wide-
ranging and on-going debate, without sparking off any controversy 
that was gratuitous or detached from the reality of contemporary 
thought. By considering the detrimental effects of a particular 
doctrine, the article in question contributed to a discussion of the 
various possible reasons behind the extermination of the Jews in 
Europe, a question of indisputable public interest in a democratic 
society. The Court noted that the search for historical truth is an 
integral part of freedom of expression and that the article written by 
the applicant was in no way “gratuitously offensive” or insulting and 
did not incite disrespect or hatred.55 Consequently, the applicant’s 
 
 51. X. v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7992/77 (July 12, 1978 E. C. H. R) (obligation 
on motor-cyclists to wear a helmet). 
 52. Paul Martens, L’irrésistible ascension du principe de proportionnalité, in PRESENCE 
DU DROIT PUBLIC ET DES DROITS DE L’HOMME: MELANGES OFFERTS A JACQUES VELU 51 
(1992). 
 53. Giniewski v. France, App. No. 64016/00 (Jan. 31, 2006, Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 54. Id. at § 32; see also Eur. Conv. on H.R., art. 10, § 2. 
 55. Id. §§ 49–53. 
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conviction on the charge of public defamation of the Christian 
community did not meet a pressing social need 
B. Balancing of Interests 
Where two opposing provisions of one and the same 
instrument—Articles 9 and 10 in this case—contradict each other, 
the principle of proportionality is irrelevant. In this situation, the 
Court takes a different approach—that of the balancing of interests—
to check whether the right balance has been struck between two 
conflicting freedoms or rights.56 Looking at it in another way, we are 
no longer dealing with a freedom and the exceptions to it, but with 
an interpretative dialectic that must seek to reconcile freedoms. 
Where does the point of equilibrium lie between freedom of 
expression and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion? 
The I.A. v. Turkey judgment of September 13, 2005 concerned 
the prosecution of the author of a novel, The Forbidden Phrases, 
which contained “an abusive attack on the Prophet of Islam.”57 The 
Court observed that it was not disputed that the applicant’s 
conviction had amounted to interference with his right to freedom 
of expression. The interference had been prescribed by law and had 
pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder and protecting 
morals and the rights of others. As to deciding whether the 
interference had been necessary, this involved weighing up the 
conflicting interests relating to the exercise of two fundamental 
freedoms, namely the applicant’s right to impart his ideas on 
religion, on the one hand, and the right of others to respect for their 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, on the other. Certain 
passages in the novel in question had attacked the Prophet 
Muhammad in an abusive manner. Therefore, the measure at issue 
had been intended to provide protection against offensive attacks on 
matters regarded as sacred by Muslims and could reasonably be 
regarded as meeting a “pressing social need.”58 In addition, the 
authorities had not exceeded their margin of appreciation, and the 
reasons given by the domestic courts to justify the measure taken 
 
 56. See François Rigaux, Logique et droits de l’homme in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: 
THE EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE, STUDIES IN MEMORY OF ROLV RYSSDAL 1197–1211 (Paul 
Mahoney et al. ed., 2000). 
 57. I.A. v. Turkey, § 29, App No. 42571/09 (Dec. 13, 2005, Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
 58. Id. at § 30. 
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against the applicant had been relevant and sufficient. As to whether 
the conviction had been proportionate, the Court noted that the 
national courts had not seized the book in question, and that the 
small fine imposed appeared to be proportionate to the aims pursued 
and accordingly found no violation. 
There are those who believe that balancing interests is more a 
matter of rhetoric than of method. What is the real meaning of this 
balance metaphor? It is a question of weighing up rights in relation 
one to another and giving priority to the one to which greater value 
is attached. Three quite particular difficulties arise here. The first is 
what we call incommensurability of rights. The very image of the 
balance presupposes the existence of a common scale against which 
the respective importance or the weight of different rights could be 
measured, which is highly unrealistic. For example, finding the 
balance between a Church’s freedom of religion and its followers’ 
freedom of expression “is more like judging whether a particular line 
is longer than a particular rock is heavy.”59 The second is that of 
subjectivity. By using the metaphor of the balance, in fact one leaves 
the court great freedom of judgment and this can have formidable 
effects on judicial reasoning.60 
The third difficulty lies in the fact that the parties are not in 
symmetrical positions and so the importance attributed to each of 
their rights may depend on their relative positions. The Otto-
Preminger-Institut v. Austria judgment of September 24, 1994 is a 
good example of this. The Austrian authorities objected to the 
showing of a satirical film by a cinema club in Tyrol on the ground 
that it ridiculed the Christian faith in general. Whereas it was a 
private association that invoked freedom of expression, the freedom 
of religion was that of all persons of the Catholic faith who might 
feel offended by the images in the film that were considered 
blasphemous. On the one hand we have a private individual, and on 
the other a community of believers: the possibility cannot be ruled 
out that the balance of rights was influenced, more or less 
consciously, by the impression that an individual’s freedom of 
expression had to be measured or weighed against the interests of all 
 
 59. Bendix Autolite Cort. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting). See e.g., INCOMMENSURABILITY, INCOMPARABILITY AND PRACTICAL REASON 
(Ruth Chang ed., 1997); BENOÎT FRYDMAN, LE SENS DES LOIS 436 (2005). 
 60. White v. Sweden, App. No. 42435/02 (September 19, 2006 Eur. Ct. H. R.). 
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Catholics in the Austrian province of Tyrol. “The Court cannot 
disregard the fact that the Roman Catholic religion is the religion of 
the overwhelming majority of Tyroleans. In seizing the film, the 
Austrian authorities acted to ensure religious peace in that region 
and to prevent that some people should feel the object of attacks on 
their religious beliefs in an unwarranted and offensive manner.”61 In 
fact, Roscoe Pound largely anticipated this danger as long ago as 
1921 when he wrote: “When it comes to weighing or valuing claims 
or demands, we must be careful to compare them on the same plane. 
If we put one as an individual interest and the other as a social 
interest, we may decide the question in advance of our very way of 
putting it.”62 
C. The Choice of Priorities 
As is emphasised by P. Ducoulombier, hierarchy is sometimes 
taboo in legal thinking, either for philosophical reasons relating in 
particular to the principle of indivisibility of fundamental human 
rights or on more methodological or practical grounds, some people 
thinking that such an approach is naive or pointless;63 other writers 
 
 61. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, § 56, App. No. 13470/87 (September 24, 1994 
Eur. Ct. H.R.). See also Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90 (November 
25, 1996 Eur. Ct. H.R), where the applicant complained of the British authorities’ refusal to 
authorise the distribution, even limited to part of the public, of a video film containing erotic 
scenes involving St Theresa of Avila and Christ. According to the authorities, the film should 
be regarded as an insulting or offensive attack directed against the religious beliefs of Christians 
and therefore constituted an offence against the blasphemy laws. The Court also considered 
that the state could legitimately have limited the applicant’s freedom of expression in order to 
protect the rights of others, in this case their right of religious freedom. Thus it extends its 
interpretation of Article 9 by stating that this provision implies the right of believers to be 
protected from provocative representations of objects of religious veneration. In this case the 
applicant also stressed that the offence of blasphemy only covered attacks on the Christian 
faith, and more specifically the Anglican faith, and argued that this offence should therefore be 
seen as discriminatory. Here, however, the Court refrained from answering that argument, 
merely pointing out that the degree of protection afforded by the law to other beliefs is not at 
issue before the Court (§ 50). However, the reality is indeed the fact that the film in question 
was an attack on the dominant religion. As François Rigaux observes, “it is not freedom of 
religion but the power of a religion that is threatened.” See La liberté d’expression et ses limites, 
Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, 411 (1993). 
 62. Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interest, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1943). 
 63. PHILIPPE FRUMER, LA RENONCIATION AUX DROITS ET LIBERTES. LA CONVENTION 
EUROPEENNE A L’EPREUVE DE LA VOLONTE INDIVIDUELLE (2001); Sébastien Van 
Drooghenbroeck, L’horizontalisation des droits in LA RESPONSABILITE, FACE CACHEE DES 
DROITS DE L’HOMME 381–82 (Hugues Dumont et al. eds., 2005). 
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are in favour.64 Personally, I do not think one can escape the need to 
try and establish criteria by which this exercise might be guided.65 
For example, a distinction can be drawn between core rights, 
those at the heart or centre, and those on the periphery. Freedom of 
religion has an inner and an outer aspect. Its inner dimension—that 
is to say, the right of everyone to have a religion and to change it, or 
to have none at all—would be among the core rights. No limitation 
or restriction could be placed on it, even if linked to freedom of 
expression when, for example, the latter entails incitement to hate 
speech, violence, or discrimination, on the basis of religious 
allegiance. 
The limits, or the difficulty, of this approach lie in the fact that, 
over and above certain obvious factors (in particular inalienable 
rights), it is no easy matter to identify the hard core. On the one 
hand, doctrinal attempts to establish a hierarchy among the various 
rights have to date largely failed.66 On the other hand, the same is 
true of attempts to identify exactly what the European Court regards 
as the inviolable essence of each of the rights secured by the 
Convention. 
D. Practical Concordance 
This approach based on practical concordance between 
conflicting rights has been subjected to the most detailed theoretical 
treatment, by the German constitutionalist K. Hesse,67 and is to be 
 
 64. Dinah Shelton, Mettre En Balance Les Droits: Vers Une Hiérarchie Des Normes En 
Droit International Des Droits De L’homme, in CLASSER LES DROITS DE L’HOMME 153 
(Emmanuelle Bribosia & Ludovic Hennebel eds., 2004). See also Dinah Shelton, Normative 
Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J.INT’L L. 291 (2006); Dominique Breillat, La 
hiérarchie des droits de l’homme, in DROIT ET POLITIQUE A LA CROISEE DES CULTURES: 
MELANGES PHILIPPE ARDANT 353 (1999); Frederic Sudre, Droits intangibles et/ou droits 
fondamentaux: y a-t-il des droits prééminents dans la Convention européenne des droits de 
l’homme?, in LIBER AMICORUM MARC-ANDRE EISSEN 381 (1995); Olivier Jacot-Guillarmod, 
Rapport entre démocratie et droits de l’homme, in DEMOCRATIE ET DROITS DE L’HOMME 49, 
69 (1990) (referring to a material hierarchy constructed by European case law, via the concept 
of democratic society); ELISABETH LAMBERT ABDELGAWAD, LES EFFETS DES ARRETS DE LA 
COUR EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME. CONTRIBUTION A UNE APPROCHE 
PLURALISTE DU DROIT EUROPEEN DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 323 (1999). 
 65. See Donna J. Sullivan, Gender Equality and Religious Freedom: Toward a Framework 
for Conflict Resolution, 24 N.Y.U J. INT’L. L. & POL. 795 (1992). 
 66. FRUMER, supra note 63, at 522–27. 
 67. See KONRAD HESSE, GRUNDZÜGE DES VERFASSUNGSRECHTS DER 
BUNDESREPUBLIK DEUTSCHLAND, nos. 71 et seq. (20th ed., 1995). On this practical 
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seen in numerous decisions of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. The 
starting-point for this approach is the outright refusal to move in the 
direction of sacrificing one right to another. In other words, where 
rights are in conflict, it is not appropriate to turn straightaway to the 
balance in order to decide which right weighs heavier and deserves to 
be upheld at the expense of all its competitors. On the contrary, the 
aim should be, in an imaginative dialectical perspective involving 
mutual concessions that attenuate contradictory requirements, to 
delay the inexorable sacrifice until the last possible moment. The 
novel character of this approach lies in the fact that it fosters 
solutions that preserve the two conflicting rights to the maximum 
rather than simply finding a point of balance between them. 
An example of this is seen in the Öllinger v. Austria judgment of 
June 29, 2006. The applicant notified the Salzburg Federal Police 
Authority that on November 1, 1998, he would be holding a 
meeting at the municipal cemetery in front of the war memorial in 
memory of the Jews killed by the SS during the Second World War. 
He stressed that the meeting would coincide with the gathering of 
Comradeship IV (Kameradschaft IV) to commemorate the SS 
soldiers killed during the Second World War. The Salzburg police 
authority banned the meeting and the public security authority 
dismissed the applicant’s appeal against that decision. Both the police 
authority and the public security authority considered it necessary to 
prohibit the meeting planned by the applicant in order to avoid any 
disturbance to the commemorative meeting organised by 
Comradeship IV, which was regarded as a popular ceremony for 
which no authorisation was required. In these circumstances, the 
Court was “not convinced by the Government’s argument that 
allowing both meetings while taking preventive measures, such as 
ensuring police presence in order to keep the two assemblies apart, 
was not a viable alternative which would have preserved the 
applicant’s right to freedom of assembly while at the same time 
offering a sufficient degree of protection as regards the rights of the 
cemetery’s visitors.”68 In other words, the government presented the 
 
concordance, see also FRIEDRICH MÜLLER, DISCOURS DE LA MÉTHODE JURIDIQUE 285–87 
(O. Jouanjan trans. 1996), and SEBASTIEN VAN DROOGHENBROECK, LA PROPORTIONNALITE 
DANS LE DROIT DE LA CONVENTION EUROPEENNE DES DROITS DE L’HOMME 212, 709–10 
(2001). 
 68. Öllinger v. Austria, App. No.76900/01 (June 29, 2006 Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
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conflict as necessary, whereas it could also be regarded as accidental 
and as originating in the attitude of the authorities. 
The limitation on the practical concordance approach is that it 
lacks a constructive dimension: it does not include the need to try 
and change the context in which the conflict arose. In other words, 
it takes no account of the need to develop imaginative solutions in 
order to limit the conflict itself and prevent it from arising again in 
the future. 
E. A Constructive Procedural Approach 
This final approach operates in two stages. First of all, it takes 
account of the fact that, in many situations, the conflict between 
fundamental rights has its origin in the existence of a certain context 
that creates the conditions for conflict. Conflicts appear inevitable as 
long as these conditions are not taken into account and those that 
can be changed are not identified. In concrete terms, the state must 
explore all avenues that may enable the conflict to be overcome 
before pleading that it is facing a dilemma—and perhaps also 
recognize its responsibility in creating the context that gave rise to 
the conflict. 
In the area of concern to us here, the Otto-Preminger-Institut v. 
Austria judgment of September 20, 1994 strikes me as a perfect 
counter-example. In fact, all the conditions seemed to be present for 
the persons likely to be offended by the works at issue not to be 
exposed to them. The film was intended for showing in a film club 
to a select audience, its subject had been announced in the 
programme, and access was denied to minors under the age of 
seventeen. So there was no reason for persons who might have been 
offended to go to the club and see it. The Court states that the very 
fact of advertising the screening of the film and the nature of it was a 
sufficiently “public” expression to give offence.69 Nevertheless, as P. 
Wachsmann says, that analysis means that in the Court’s view the 
offence lies “not in the fact of exposing them directly to images such 
as to offend their faith, but in the mere fact of drawing their 
attention to the existence of a work which they would consider 
blasphemous,” and “ultimately turns against the association the 
 
 69. Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, App. No. 13470/87, § 56 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 
1994). 
DO NOT DELETE 7/10/2015  12:00 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2014 
528 
legitimate precautions which it had taken to prevent anyone who 
might feel his beliefs to be under attack from seeing the film.”70 
The same holds true of the Wingrove v. the United Kingdom 
judgment of 25 November 1996. The possibility was open to the 
authorities of limiting distribution of the video to licensed sex shops 
or to persons above a certain age.71 In the circumstances, one may 
question the proportion of the measure chosen by the authorities, 
that is to say, the total prohibition on the film’s distribution. 
Then—this is the second stage—once every step has been taken 
to avoid a conflict, procedures for settling it should be openly 
debated. The important thing in this connection, to my way of 
thinking, is not so much to apply predefined arithmetical formulae or 
to invent architectural structures of some sort to guide judicial 
reasoning, but to bring about the conditions for a debate in which 
all interested parties without exception can express their views, so 
that everyone’s interests can be taken into account and into 
consideration in the discussion. This is precisely the free-ranging 
discussion whose prerequisites were stated by Habermas in his 
Ethique de la communication: “Everyone must be able to raise the 
problem inherent in any statement, whatever it be; everyone must be 
able to express his views, wishes and needs; no speaker should be 
prevented by authoritarian pressure, whether from inside or outside 
the discussion, from exercising his rights [of free discussion].”72 
Furthermore, such procedures offer the advantage of fostering an 
on-going re-assessment of provisions, which might make it possible 
for different rights to be reconciled. This question of reconciliation 
of rights is to my mind essential, and I believe that open, public 
debates on issues linked to religion and religious beliefs, in complete 
objectivity and impartiality, can certainly assist it. 
 
 70. Patrick Wachsmann, La Religion Contre La Liberté D’expression: Sur Un Arrêt 
Regrettable De La Cour Européenne Des Droits De L’homme, 12 REVUE UNIVERSELLE DES 
DROITS DE L’HOMME 445, 445–46 (1994). 
 71. Wingrove v. the United Kingdom, App. No. 17419/90 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1996). 
 72. Jürgen Habermas, Notes Programmatiques Pour Fonder En Raison Une Éthique De 
La Discussion, in MORALE ET COMMUNICATION 110–11 (1986). 
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As legal theorists have observed, “the law must be stable yet it 
cannot stand still.”73 Adaptation and modification have been 
constant features of the Convention since 1950 and continue to be 
so today. The Convention is now sixty years old and the Court’s case 
law has been evolving for fifty years, alongside profound changes 
that have occurred in Europe over recent decades. The Convention 
has become a pan-European instrument of protection of human 
rights and, in many countries, has made it possible to achieve a level 
of respect for fundamental rights that would have been hardly 
imaginable in 1950 when the Convention was drafted. It would 
probably not have survived if it had not been regarded as a living 
instrument that has to be interpreted in line with developments in 
the society in which we live. The development of law is inseparable 
from the development of society. 
The European Court of Human Rights is the only European-
level jurisdiction exclusively charged with adjudicating human rights 
complaints. Could it be regarded as assuming the role of a 
Constitutional Court of Europe? My answer is clearly no—but I will 
not discuss this issue here. Nevertheless, as pointed out by Julie 
Ringelheim, “analysis of the Court’s case law can shed an important 
light on the debate on religion and European constitutionalism.”74 
Why? Because the role of the Court, as a supranational judicial body, 
is to “define common standards on religious freedom in a religiously 
diverse Europe,”75 i.e., a Europe characterized by religious diversity. 
It is a challenging task but indispensable for the protection of human 
rights. 
As observed by the former president of the Court, Nicolas 
Bratza, “it is worth emphasising that there have always been two 
challenges for the Court in protecting the rights guaranteed by 
Article 9, which will not necessarily be felt by national courts charged 
with the same task. First, it is readily apparent that the 47 
Contracting States have very different religious and cultural 
 
 73. Attributed to Roscoe Pound in his book INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY 
(1923). 
 74. Ringelheim, supra note 41. 
 75. Id. 
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backgrounds, and the Convention seeks to ensure that, as far as 
possible, all such traditions are respected. Second, the Convention 
does not endorse or indeed require any particular model of Church-
state relations. The Court must therefore strike a balance between, 
on the one hand, the effective protection of individual rights and, on 
the other, the need to respect very different constitutional traditions 
among the Contracting States.”76 
 
 
 76. Bratza, supra note 14, at 257–58. 
